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 The following paper is an ethnographic study that was conducted over the course 
of eleven months while working in León, Nicaragua, for an international NGO. It adds to 
existing literature that illustrate the shortfalls of community-based tourism projects, 
particularly when multiple stakeholders are involved. It focuses its attention on the 
cultural misunderstandings between the NGO, municipal government, and a rural tourism 
cooperative regarding tourism development and land management. Furthermore, it 
highlights the cooperative’s efforts in maintaining its agency when it felt as though its 
interests were being ignored by organizations with greater social, political, and economic 
capital than they had.  
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 I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the Fuertes Juntos leadership and 
staff for graciously opening their doors to a young college student curious about social 
impact and community development. I thank them for inviting me to observe them in 
practice, allowing me to pick their brains, offering me an abundance of resources, and, 
above all, providing me with access to the communities on the Telica Rota Natural 
Reserve with whom I eventually formed long-lasting relationships. They also coordinated 
my transport to and from the rural communities at the center of my research, sparing me 
the inconvenience of reaching them by foot or horseback along a steep and poorly 
maintained dirt path. They made my research possible by accommodating me day in and 
day out as I both volunteered for them and learned from them. 
 I also owe a huge thank you to my thesis advisor, Dr. Christa Cesario. Her 
continued guidance during these past two years has provided me with the insight and 
confidence necessary to even begin thinking about the daunting task set before me of 
conducting original research in a foreign country in a language not native to me. Our 
regular Skype and in-person meetings were indispensable, and they served me in learning 
the art of meticulous record keeping while in the field, as well as analyzing my data and 
writing my thesis once returning to the United States. Admittedly, I failed to follow her 
advice on more than one occasion, leading to major setbacks in my research, such as 
when I delayed backing up my field notes and lost them due to a rather unfortunate 
technical mishap. Perhaps the biggest lesson of all: Always listen to your thesis advisor. 
Jokes aside, I also credit her, along with Dr. Adriana Petryna and Dr. Amber Reed, for 
inspiring my interest in the field of international development. Her writing seminar 
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course, Global Development and NGOs, allowed me to engage critically with themes in 
humanitarianism and the problems they can present, motivating me to learn more. 
 I would also like to acknowledge the following people for their support: Shannon 
Renninger, Ariel Smith, and Dr. Brian Spooner of the Penn Anthropology Department; 
Daniel Soley; Erika Perez; Adolfo Pacheco; Carlos Jimenez; Luke Pekrul; former Peace 
Corps volunteer Eric Insler; and Lucia Solorzano Tinoco. On many occasions, they 
provided me with their time and insight, helped keep me on track, and encouraged me to 
complete my research, especially when I felt overwhelmed and at a loss about how to 
proceed at each turn. I would also like to thank my family for standing by my decision to 
prolong my stay in Nicaragua from 10 weeks to nearly eight months in 2015, and for 
allowing me to return this past summer for an additional three months to answer 
questions that I had left unanswered during my first trip. Additionally, this project would 
not have been possible without the generous funding of the International Internship 
Program to cover my living expenses while volunteering and conducting research abroad. 
 Last but not least, I sincerely appreciate the cooperation of those living in the 
Telica Rota Natural Reserve. They warmly welcomed me to their homes, introduced me 
to their families, and showed me their ways of life. The perseverance and charitableness 
they demonstrated during my community visits helped me better understand their motives 
for partaking in development projects. They also shared with me their unfiltered opinions 
regarding the aid they receive; this information has proven invaluable in constructing a 
narrative that is faithful to all perspectives presented in this paper. It also better equips me 
to use my thesis as an opportunity to advocate for the community’s interests as Fuertes 
Juntos decides on its next project. 
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Introduction 
 Nicaragua: Land of Lakes and Volcanoes reads the unofficial slogan of the small 
Central American country that lies sandwiched between Costa Rica to its south, and 
Honduras to its north. Its six million inhabitants indeed live in a land abounding in 
natural resources; its epithet comes from being home to 24 volcanoes and a plethora of 
freshwater ecosystems (The World Bank; Visit Nicaragua). It is these qualities that make 
Nicaragua a backpacker haven for many budget-conscious tourists who want to “trek off 
the beaten path” and explore a country that promises both leisure and adventure centered 
around Nicaragua’s many active volcanoes. In fact, tourism in Nicaragua has boomed in 
recent years. The number of tourist arrivals has increased from 281,000 in 1995 to 1.3 
million in 2014 (The World Bank). With leading publications ranging from the New York 
Times and CNN to the Huffington Post and Fox News urging their readership to visit 
Nicaragua before it is spoilt, the uptick in tourist arrivals comes as little surprise (The 
New York Times; CNN; The Huffington Post; Fox News). 
 The tourism industry is plenty aware of Nicaragua’s allure, and is actively 
working to capture the imagination of visitors hoping to be wonderstruck by its awesome 
landscape despite the country’s substandard infrastructure and high rates of poverty. In 
fact, some might argue that many tourists visit Nicaragua not in spite of its 
underdevelopment, but because of it. Much to the ire of academics in development 
studies, a multitude of non-profit organizations and tour operators are making bank by 
offering high school and college students the opportunity to participate in the profitable 
economy of voluntourism; as its name suggests, voluntourism presents visitors with the 
hybrid opportunity to participate in both volunteer and tourist activities. That is, students 
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and their families pay hundreds, sometimes thousands, of dollars to live and work in 
Nicaragua’s rural communities for periods spanning from several days to several weeks 
in order to at best “make an impact” and at worst build their resumes. When they are not 
busy building houses or teaching dance at a local elementary school, they spend their free 
time hiking Volcán Mombacho or sledding down the graveled slopes of Volcán Cerro 
Negro (Figure 1). One must ask, however, how much of an impact is made when many of 
these voluntourists do not speak Spanish, are unskilled, and lack meaningful work 
experience. Some Nicaraguans fear that well-meaning tourists are not only unhelpful, but 
that they also threaten to outcompete qualified Nicaraguans working in industries reliant 
on manual labor, like construction, thus reducing the need for local employment. 
 In Summer 2016, I worked as a field leader for an American NGO that funds its 
operational costs almost entirely on foreign volunteers it hosts throughout the year. Its 
largest income providers are undergraduate students that travel to Nicaragua for ten 
weeks in the summer months to offer pro-bono small business consultations, perform eye 
exams in pop-up clinics, and conduct community needs surveys in rural, subsistence 
farming communities. These students pay over US$3,000 in program fees, and the group 
size varies yearly from between 20 students to 30 students. Most of the program 
participants were economics or engineering students in their first and second years of 
university, and the majority of students I supervised that summer lacked basic Spanish 
proficiency. Despite these shortfalls, students were expected to assume the work typically 
done by full-time, permanent staff members throughout the year in periods of just a few 
days in each community they visited. My coworkers—foreign and local like—frowned 
upon this practice due to the low-quality service the students provided, and the 
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inadequate survey responses they garnered due to their poor language skills. However, 
leadership insisted that the students were paying to gain this precise experience, and was 
reluctant to amend existing policy to incorporate what many staff members believed to be 
legitimate concerns. 
 One particularly egregious memory recalls orientation week. Senior staff 
members were instructed by their supervisor to train students in conducting community 
needs surveys in communities in which the organization has not worked in the past, and 
has no plans to work in the future. Each student was provided a slip of paper that 
included an introductory blurb about the organization that they were expected to read to 
each survey respondent. The blurb asked for the respondent’s contact information so 
organization staff would be able to notify respondents of their imminent return to that 
community in order to implement the project they described to them. Of course, this was 
all hypothetical. The respondents were unaware that what seemed like a genuine 
interaction was actually a training exercise, and became visibly emotional at the 
possibility that this organization would be able to meet the needs they expressed in the 
survey. This anecdote highlights the problem of many voluntourism programs that rely 
on program fees by “do-gooder” tourists to fund their operational costs year round. That 
is, they are oftentimes obliged to satisfy the interests of program participants before they 
can satisfy those of their intended project beneficiaries. In other words, these 
organizations profit by creating structured, resume-building programs for students by 
exploiting the lived hardships of impoverished Nicaraguans. 
 If communities do not always benefit from such projects, why do they collaborate 
with non-profit organizations at all? Part of the answer relates to the presence of an 
 6 
unequal power dynamic between NGOs and rural communities. This imbalance is based 
on differences in political and economic capital. Approximately 30 percent of 
Nicaraguans live on less than $2 per day, and nearly 50 percent of households in rural 
areas live in extreme poverty, which the World Bank defines as under $1.25 per day 
(Opportunity International; Overseas Development Institute). Many of these communities 
lack health care, paved roads, and water access, and their children sometimes hike 
upwards of one hour each way to attend school. In communities facing such dire 
circumstances, NGOs present them with greater access to wealth, often times in the form 
of microfinance, infrastructure development, and donated goods. To further illustrate, one 
high-ranking official of a large international NGO in Nicaragua told me that many 
communities agreed to certain project proposals his organization offered, only later to 
admit that those projects were actually both unwanted and unhelpful. They confided in 
him months after those projects had terminated that they accepted the aid because they 
were afraid that if they had turned it down, the NGO would either decide to forgo future 
projects, or retract its ongoing projects in the community, however baseless and untrue 
(personal communication, June 2015). In sum, rural communities with little access to 
basic amenities sometimes accept aid for fear of retribution or neglect. 
 Many NGOs acknowledge that the power imbalances described above indeed 
negatively impact their ability to appropriately respond to community needs. In order to 
better serve communities, some organizations are addressing this impediment directly. 
They accomplish this by attempting to transfer power from organizations to communities 
by moving away from voluntourism-based projects towards ones based on economic 
empowerment. These organizations do not just donate things to communities, but they 
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also actively work to ensure that communities are self-sustaining by providing them 
business training and increased access to markets. They ultimately aim to reduce reliance 
on non-profit actors by increasing communities’ economic and political capital. In this 
model, NGOs play a minimal, supportive role in the implementation and development of 
community-based projects. One such non-profit organization—and the focus of my 
ethnographic research—is the British charity Fuertes Juntos. 
 I learned of Fuertes Juntos in my junior year through the International Internship 
Program, and was instantly drawn to it. The organization was looking for volunteers to be 
learners, not doers. That is, they were searching for college students to observe them in 
practice, and support the staff only when needed. They advertised this position as an 
opportunity to conduct research on topics relating to water access, natural resource 
management, rural agriculture, and non-profit management, among others. I had spent the 
latter half of that year taking courses related to international development, and had grown 
weary and disillusioned by international humanitarian aid. That is probably why Fuertes 
Juntos stood out to me. I took their volunteer description to mean that they were aware of 
how few skills college students actually offer non-profit organizations; however, instead 
of refusing to accept volunteers entirely, they simply reimagined their role as passive 
rather than active. Furthermore, volunteers were not expected to pay program fees. They 
were expected to fund their own living expenses. These policies were enforced in order to 
avoid conflicts of interest like those described in the example provided earlier. Their 
ultimate hope was to inspire volunteers to fundraise for the organization upon their return 
to the United States, and spread awareness of the vital work it strives to accomplish. 
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 Fuertes Juntos is an international NGO located in León, Nicaragua, that traces its 
origins to another non-profit organization based in Texas, called Mercy Ships. Its 
founders, Samantha and David Smith, had graduated from the University of Oxford. 
Samantha had become a schoolteacher, and David a geologist. In 2003, however, they 
decided to leave their familiar lives in England to volunteer with Mercy Ships, which had 
committed itself to the creation and implementation of several projects on the Telica 
volcano about an hour and a half drive from the city of León. However, after just a few 
short months Mercy Ships pulled out, leaving much of their work unfinished (as often 
happens with non-profit organizations once their project cycle finishes or funding runs 
out). Samantha and David, however, were unwilling to abandon the communities with 
whom they had developed relationships. They therefore gathered the resources needed to 
found their own organization—Fuertes Juntos—in 2005. The organization has since 
expanded upon the projects Mercy Ships began; it has not only scaled up the number of 
communities it serves, but also the breadth of projects it offers. These projects include 
water access, as well as agricultural, beekeeping, and, most recently, tourism endeavors. 
The primary goal of Fuertes Juntos is to provide communities with the spiritual guidance, 
technical skills, and knowledge necessary to generate a sustainable source of income. 
 Fuertes Juntos currently has twelve full-time staff members, as well as a team of 
dedicated construction workers that they contract throughout the year. With the exception 
of the Smiths and a few foreign volunteers, all team members are Nicaraguan. The 
majority of its staff is men; only four team members are women, including Samantha. 
The team boasts beekeeping specialists, agricultural engineers, civil engineers, a social 
worker, a lawyer, a computer technician, and a pastor. Although recent financial 
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constraints have limited most employees to the office to help with administrative chores, 
in the past team members traveled daily to the countryside in order to train community 
members in everything from harvesting pineapples to bookkeeping. Most staff members 
have been with the organization for five or more years. 
Due to the Smiths’ experience with Mercy Ships, Fuertes Juntos strongly believes 
in long-term development. The organization has worked from between five to ten years in 
just six communities, and is currently conducting focus groups and community needs 
surveys to expand to other areas. These communities are relatively isolated. Some can 
only be reached by foot, while others are vehicular accessible. In fact, Fuertes Juntos is 
largely responsible for the latter. It built dirt roads in order to transport materials they 
needed to build infrastructure, like rainwater harvesting tanks to improve access to 
arsenic-free water. Although the local government has an obligation to deliver canastas 
básicas (basic goods, like sugar, salt, and cooking oil) to rural communities, for the most 
part they have been absent, long having neglected residents of the Telica volcano. 
Additionally, the local government has never collected census data on the communities, 
which were informally established approximately 50 years ago along the volcano’s slopes 
and near its crater. In fact, Fuertes Juntos has filled a gap where the government has 
failed to fulfill its obligations. For example, it conducts census surveys, provides social 
services, and creates infrastructure. Fuertes Juntos is the only NGO operating in the area, 
however in the past they have collaborated with the Peace Corps and the European 
Union, among other organizations. 
The Telica volcano communities consist of subsistence farmers, however a small 
number of those living closest to the crater also work as guides occasionally contracted 
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by foreign-owned tour operators based in the city of León. It is a largely patriarchal 
society; the men dedicate themselves to farming corn and beans, while the women devote 
themselves to childrearing and domestic chores. Women are not expected to work outside 
the home, and those that do are often criticized for being neglectful wives and mothers. 
Due to the limited amount of work available on the volcano, the average family income is 
approximately USD$100 per month. However, this amount is highly variable; it depends 
on rainfall and drought, as well as volcanic conditions. That is, the volcano regularly 
emits chemicals into the air, which can be converted into acid rain. If the wind sends the 
rain in the direction of the farms, it can destroy an entire season of crop harvest (they 
only cultivate crops twice a year).  
Due to the volatile conditions, Fuertes Juntos identified the need to develop a 
variety of income generating projects in order to diversify the local economy. They 
therefore established a model farm and apiary in each community, as well as 
implemented a community tourism project in the community located closest to the crater. 
All these projects are modeled on the concept of cooperatives. David believes that 
cooperatives are among the most effective business models, particularly in resource-
scarce regions since it reduces the burden of cost and labor for each individual associate. 
He also respects the cooperative model due to the success cooperatives have achieved 
throughout Europe. He admits that his high regard for cooperatives is in large part due to 
his British background; England was one of the first countries to adopt the cooperative 
business model. Therefore, the cooperative model Fuertes Juntos follows is a strictly 
British one, despite the fact that Nicaragua has a profound history of its own regarding 
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cooperatives. The farming, beekeeping, and tourism projects in which Fuertes Juntos 
applies cooperative theory are described below. 
The objective of the model farm is to teach community members how to harvest 
more weather-resistant crops, such as pineapples, passion fruit, plantains, bananas, and 
dragon fruit, among others (Figure 2). Once they have learned to cultivate these crops, 
they are encouraged to plant them on their own farms and trained to sell them at the local 
market. They also receive training sessions both in the field and in the office, and learn 
how to detect plant diseases, apply pesticides, price crops, maximize sales, and market 
their goods. Similarly, Fuertes Juntos’ beekeeping initiative allows community members 
to raise bees in order to harvest and bottle honey; this honey is exported to England 
where it is sold in farmers markets (Figure 3). Part of the proceeds return to the 
community beekeepers. Both the farming cooperatives and beekeeping cooperatives are 
informal collectives. They are not registered businesses, and they lack the minimum 
personnel necessary to become official cooperatives. They consist of five to ten 
community members. In most communities, these members are men. However, the most 
successful cooperative Fuertes Juntos supports is all female. These individuals coordinate 
weekly visits to the model farm, and divvy up the work as they see fit. They share the 
same fertilizer, pesticide, and inorganic compounds, and are expected to sell their 
products together and share the income. 
 Fuertes Juntos’ most recent foray in cooperative development was spearheading a 
tourism project with the same communities it had collaborated with to implement the 
projects described above. Likewise, it was intended to provide an additional source of 
income, particularly to individuals living closest to the crater. Fuertes Juntos worked in 
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cohort with community members, the municipal government, the Nicaragua Tourism 
Board, and the European Union to construct tourism infrastructure and train community 
members in how to form an official tourism cooperative and successfully compete with 
foreign tour operators based in León. The goal of Fuertes Juntos was to center tourism 
around the community, and ensure that they were the primary beneficiaries of all tourism 
activity occurring near the crater. This project is consistent with widespread support of 
tourism as a poverty reduction strategy in developing and least developed countries. This 
subset of tourism is referred to in the literature as “pro-poor” tourism. That is, tourism 
that provides net economic, social, environmental, and/or cultural benefit for individuals 
living under the poverty line (Rotarou 2014). 
 The opportunity to develop a “pro-poor” tourism project was glaring. Foreign tour 
operators had been visiting the community with tourists almost daily to hike along the 
crater during the day, and peer into it at night to catch a glimpse of incandescent rocks 
and exposed lava. All the while, the community was unable to cash in on these tourist 
arrivals; they lacked infrastructure, business know-how, and seed capital to found their 
own tour operation. Therefore, they engaged with existing tourism in a limited capacity. 
The little revenue they received came from charging tour operators an entrance fee to 
pass through their land. Fuertes Juntos aimed to change this by providing community 
members with the necessary tools (e.g. knowledge, skills, and infrastructure) to 
competitively participate in the tourism industry.  
 When the opportunity arose, Fuertes Juntos enthusiastically accepted a grant from 
the European Union to provide technical and infrastructural support to a group of 13 men 
(and one woman) from a rural subsistence farming community to establish a tourism 
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cooperative (which they named Telica Unida) near the crater of Telica. The project, 
called Ruta Colonial y de los Volcanes, was an initiative funded by the European Union 
that aimed to support local economic development through Nicaragua’s emerging tourism 
sector. The European Union dispersed £7 million to various non-profit organizations (like 
Fuertes Juntos) across the country to support the growth of tourism services and 
infrastructure in rural, underserved areas in collaboration with municipal governments 
and the Nicaragua Tourism Board. Using these funds, Fuertes Juntos constructed a café, 
visitor’s center, and hostel, as well as erected multiple maps and hiking trail markers. 
Fuertes Juntos also funded full time staff and hired contractors to provide training in price 
setting, customer service, restaurant management, bookkeeping, basic accounting, safety 
and first aid, and tour giving (Figure 4). The organization ultimately hoped to integrate its 
ongoing projects (i.e. farming and beekeeping) into this newest initiative by offering tour 
packages that would allow tourists to tour the model farm and apiary with local guides as 
a way to learn about Fuertes Juntos, and also to gain insight into the lives of people living 
on the volcano. These tour packages would also allow tourists to have direct contact with 
community farmers and beekeepers, providing them with the opportunity to purchase 
produce or honey from them on site.  
 This tourism project is the centerpiece of the essay that follows. It presented 
various challenges, including but not limited to conflicting ideologies between 
stakeholders regarding cooperative development, land ownership, and natural resource 
management. The project also left Fuertes Juntos financially crippled. They spent more 
than their budget allotted, leaving them in debt. This was in part due to their commitment 
to providing high-quality service despite the potential costs. However, it was also 
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discovered towards the final weeks of the project that poor bookkeeping, lack of 
communication, and competition for financing among managers of the tourism and 
agricultural projects were also to blame for the financial crisis that ensued. This forced 
Fuertes Juntos to lay off employees, and focus its attention away from its tourism 
initiative towards other projects that were more likely to garner funding (i.e. clean water, 
food security, and beekeeping). This was not only bad news for Fuertes Juntos, but it was 
also a blow to Telica Unida. Fuertes Juntos had little choice but to leave construction 
projects unfinished. The café lacked kitchen appliances, and a volcanic eruption left its 
ceiling looking like Swiss cheese. Additionally, the hostel lacked beds, doors, and 
windows, as well as electricity. Although the cooperative members felt grateful in many 
ways, they felt gipped in several others. While still full of potential, “pro-poor” tourism 
on the Telica Rota Natural Reserve provides a classic case study of some of the shortfalls 




 The rapid rise of tourism in Nicaragua since the mid-1990s coincides with the 
global spread of neoliberalism as the prevailing economic theory of the late 20th century 
through the present day. Proponents of neoliberalism argue in favor of economic 
diversification. That is, they believe that countries should not rely on a single industry, 
but instead should invest in several economic sectors. Furthermore, they believe that 
worldwide economic integration can improve the quality of life in rural areas by reducing 
poverty and inversely increasing material wealth (Gössling 2003, 383). Tourism supports 
both of these neoliberal aspirations. Moreover, development organizations believe that 
tourism is able to “initiate and support local development, while transferring capital 
resources from the developed to the developing world” (Gössling 2003, 384). This runs 
counter to popular opinion that tourism supports exploitative relations between largely 
wealthy Western tourists and locals by framing international tourism as a wealth 
distribution method. Tourism proponents refer to this phenomenon as the 
democratization of the dollar (Vanegas and Croes 2007, 7). 
 Due to the socioeconomic possibilities tourism evokes, it has garnered political 
and financial support among governments and civil society alike. It is preferred over 
other industries due to its ability to “[improve] the standard of living, [and increase] 
Foreign Exchange Earnings for a country and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)” 
(Magigi and Ramadhani 2013, 1108). Tourism as a poverty reduction strategy in 
developing and least-developed countries has been implemented throughout the Global 
South using both bottom-up (e.g. grassroots development) and top-down (e.g. non-profit 
organizations, foreign-owned businesses) approaches, and it has been correlated with 
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substantial economic expansion (Vanegas and Croes 2007, 13). For example, the United 
Nations’ Millennium agenda aimed to reduce extreme poverty worldwide from 30 
percent in 1990 to 15 percent by 2015 (Vanegas, Gartner, and Senauer 2015, 159). As a 
result, poverty relief efforts focused on stimulating the agricultural, manufacturing, and 
tourism sectors. Among them, tourism was found to generate the most jobs, stimulate 
economic expansion, and equalize income distribution (Vanegas and Croes 2007, 5). 
Tourism can provide locals with the opportunity to sell handmade crafts or occupy jobs 
that require few skills. However, if the poor are not leading their own economic 
development, they are unable to fully benefit from tourism initiatives. As a result, rural 
community-based tourism has become a popular alternative to conventional tourism in 
alleviating poverty. 
 The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNTWO) argues that tourism 
is a logical intervention in poor communities because rural areas are often abundant in 
attributes sought by tourists. The UNTWO also asserts that tourism offers direct client 
interaction, provides job opportunities to women and youth, and supports the 
conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage (Zapata, Hall, Lindo, and 
Vanderschaeghe 2011, 726). When the needs and opportunities of the poor are considered 
in developing tourism initiatives, it is referred to in the literature as pro-poor tourism 
(Ashley, Boyd, and Goodwin 2000, 1). In order for the poor to economically participate 
in tourism, Ashley et al. (2000) stress that they must receive skills training, access to 
social capital, and negotiating power with tourism companies. The authors further write 
that tourism can support livelihood goals, expand economic opportunities, build assets, 
and improve locals’ ability to influence policy, while also undermine economic security 
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due to the industry’s volatility, place constraints on other subsistence activities, erode 
assets by overburdening ecosystems, and exacerbate policy constraints (Ashley, Boyd, 
and Goodwin 2000, 4). In order to lessen the negative consequences of rural tourism, the 
authors argue that efforts should be pro-poor and community-based. That is, locals need 
to take ownership of tourism initiatives if they hope to benefit from them. In other words, 
their interests need to be placed above those of other stakeholders. 
 The economic potential of tourism has not been lost on the Government of 
Nicaragua. In 2002 it joined the international bandwagon in creating policy aimed at 
supporting tourism development as a poverty reduction strategy. After Haiti, Nicaragua is 
the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (Vanegas and Croes 2007, 5). In 
2015, its GDP per capita was USD$5,000 (CIA Factbook). Furthermore, nearly half of its 
population lives in poverty, and 15 percent of them live in extreme poverty (Vanegas and 
Croes 2007, 5; Vanegas, Gartner, and Senauer 2015, 161). In order to accommodate 
tourist arrivals, the government has expanded its international airport, created a 
promotional campaign, and invested in infrastructure and facilities (Vanegas and Croes 
2007, 5; Vanegas, Gartner, and Senauer 2015, 167). Additionally, Nicaragua signed the 
Declaration of San José, which states that tourism development should be “socially and 
environmentally responsible, economically viable, and directed to enrich the culture” 
(Höckert 2011, 10). Nicaragua has essentially created an economic policy that favors 
community-based tourism. 
 In spite of Nicaragua’s policy, most community-based tourism projects are not 
locally derived. Over 60 percent of community-based tourism projects are started by 
donors and NGOs, which can have little impact in alleviating poverty, in part due to their 
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low life expectancy following the end of project cycles (Zapata, Hall, Lindo, and 
Vanderschaeghe 2011, 727). In Zapata et al.’s (2011) study of the Community Based 
Tourism Nicaraguan Network, the researchers found that tourism provided increased 
employment opportunities, while failing to generate a substantial amount of direct 
income (Zapata, Hall, Lindo, and Vanderschaeghe 2011, 736). On the other hand, they 
also learned that women had greater participation in the labor market through the 
revalorization of traditional female skills (Zapata, Hall, Lindo, and Vanderschaeghe 
2011, 378). On the Telica Rota Natural Reserve, for instance, women are encouraged to 
participate in Fuertes Juntos’ tourism project as contracted cooks and servers. There is 
also an abundance of external funding available for NGOs that aim to provide income-
generating projects for women. This can impact project development, implementation, 
and beneficiaries. 
 Among Zapata et al.’s (2011) most intriguing revelations related to the minimal 
economic impact made by top-down community-based tourism projects. NGOs and 
donors focused on long-haul markets based on their networks, despite the fact that long-
haul markets are largely removed from local community members’ networks (Zapata, 
Hall, Lindo, and Vanderschaeghe 2011, 742). As Zapata writes, “Western ideas were 
applied without translation to the local resources available in the context of [community-
based tourism] in Nicaragua” (Zapata, Hall, Lindo, and Vanderschaeghe 2011, 743). 
Moreover, community members were expected to learn about Western culture in order to 
better market their services to that clientele (Zapata, Hall, Lindo, and Vanderschaeghe 
2011, 743). I witnessed that firsthand when Telica Unida members were told during 
training sessions by the Nicaragua Tourism Board to abandon traditional recipes when 
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creating their café menu in favor of Western dishes in order to appeal to the gringo’s 
palette. They were also encouraged to create an “authentic” experience for tourists by 
telling them stories of living life on an active volcano. However, tour guides ended up 
reusing sensational stories they were told by their neighbors, thus undermining the 
authenticity of their tours. 
 The literature argues that community-based tourism can indeed stimulate 
economies and reduce poverty. However, they caution that communities must be at the 
center of tourism development if they are to receive the full economic benefits of tourist 
arrivals. In the case of community-based tourism in Nicaragua where over 60 percent of 
projects are founded by external actors, this is particularly pertinent. Fisher (1997) argues 
that NGOs can either be democratic or oligarchic. To avoid the latter, NGOs must strive 
to provide community members with increased participation in project development and 
implementation (458). In rural Nicaragua, NGOs should be expected to make an extra 
effort to ensure that community members’ worldviews, desires, and interests are 





 I traveled to Nicaragua on two separate occasions to conduct a multi-sited 
ethnography (Marcus 1995). During my first visit, I volunteered with Fuertes Juntos, and 
was financed by a travel grant provided by the International Internship Program. I 
traveled to Nicaragua in May 2015, and returned to the United States in January 2016; 
my stay lasted just over seven months. Prior to my arrival, I consulted with Samantha to 
make clear my intentions to conduct research based on my volunteer experience. My 
research would be written as my honors thesis for the Anthropology Department at Penn. 
I also promised Samantha I would provide her with the final copy of my paper so that 
Fuertes Juntos could consider my findings. In this way, the objective of my research has 
always been to support the organization’s existing and future projects by highlighting 
challenges, exposing deficits, and providing insight into community members’ 
perspectives. Due to the motives of my research and its possible impact, this project 
easily falls into the category of applied anthropology. 
 In my first two months, I was expected to go to the countryside with staff 
members three to four times per week. This is standard protocol for all of Fuertes Juntos’ 
volunteers so that they can learn about the projects the organization has implemented 
through conducting site visits, witnessing staff at work, and meeting community 
members. This was particularly useful in allowing me to enter the field as an 
anthropologist. I became a familiar face among staff members and project beneficiaries 
alike, and also had the opportunity to meet several key figures in the community. When I 
introduced myself to community members and Fuertes Juntos staff, I always made sure to 
state that I was not only Fuertes Juntos’ newest volunteer, but that I was also an 
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anthropology student interested in researching the organization and its relationship to the 
communities in which it works. Many Nicaraguans I met were unfamiliar with 
anthropology—only one university in the entire country offers anthropology as a possible 
area of study. Therefore, I attempted to describe my particular concentration (i.e. cultural 
anthropology) in plain terms that emphasized my interest in inter-group relations. My 
goal was for all possible research participants to understand who I was and what my 
research entailed. Unfortunately, though, many community members perceived me to be 
more of a volunteer than a researcher. My close association with Fuertes Juntos made it 
difficult to get honest feedback from community members during my interviews. 
 To illustrate, I interviewed Telica Unida members in December 2015, and again 
in August 2016. In December 2015, the interviews were short because community 
members’ responses were concise. They seemed unwilling to expand on their responses 
or use the interview as an opportunity to voice their grievances. In fact, to my surprise 
hardly anyone had anything negative to say about a project that had more or less failed. 
This stood in contrast to conversations I had overheard between community members 
during site visits, which revealed frustration in the project and mistrust in Fuertes Juntos. 
Instead, the community members heaped praise on Fuertes Juntos, even when I provided 
them with opportunities to say otherwise. In August 2016, Telica Unida members 
continued to express their gratefulness for Fuertes Juntos’ efforts. However, they were 
also willing to admit that the tourism project was not everything that it was hyped to be. 
Some expressed that the time and energy they expended in labor did not produce 
adequate income, and many confided that they were disappointed with Fuertes Juntos and 
the municipal government’s lack of follow up.   
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 Other challenges I faced were the direct results of natural phenomena. During the 
months of July, August, and September, heavy rains obstructed vehicular access to field 
sites. The road conditions grew so poor that the only way to reach the communities living 
on the Telica volcano was via motorcycle, which volunteers were prohibited from riding. 
Collapsed trees and muddy terrain made it nearly impossible for Fuertes Juntos’ two 
four-wheel drives to pass. Therefore, I had little choice but to redirect my research focus 
from the countryside to the office. I used that opportunity to conduct interviews with 
organization staff, and to collect documents that pertained to Fuertes Juntos’ tourism 
initiative. I was relieved to finally visit the communities again once the rains had ceased 
and the roads had been repaired in October.  
 November, of course, brought on new challenges. The Telica volcano violently 
erupted. From its craters spewed huge, hot rocks. While fortunately no one died, the 
rocks crushed several livestock to death and damaged property. The eruption even 
destroyed the infrastructure Fuertes Juntos had inaugurated less than a month earlier. The 
Telica volcano was deemed unsafe, and the municipal government barred entry for over 
one month. Additionally, many of the communities evacuated to settlements hours away 
from León. Frustratingly, Fuertes Juntos closed for the holidays in mid-December before 
the volcano was reopened to visitors. I therefore was unable to arrange transportation to 
visit the Telica volcano before leaving Nicaragua in January. My exit from the field was 
abrupt. In a disappointing finish, I returned to the United States feeling that I had many 
questions still left unanswered. 
 Therefore, I decided to return to Nicaragua in May 2016, and stay until the end of 
August. I was reluctant to volunteer again with Fuertes Juntos for several reasons. First 
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and foremost, I wanted to cultivate my image as separate from the organization to garner 
better, more comprehensive, and more honest responses during interviews with 
community members. In other words, I did not want them to feel that their opinions could 
jeopardize their relationship with Fuertes Juntos. Second, I was interested in using my 
summer to explore the general non-profit landscape of Nicaragua. Therefore, I searched 
to involve myself with other NGOs dedicated to rural development. Third, for all 
practical purposes I needed to fund my trip. Therefore, I accepted an offer to work on a 
10-week contract as a field leader for another NGO. I describe this organization in further 
detail in my introduction (recall voluntourism). 
 During both visits, I received verbal consent from research participants to conduct 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews with Fuertes Juntos staff and leadership, 
development experts, and community members living in the Telica Rota Natural Reserve. 
In particular, I interviewed people affiliated with the tourism project, including project 
managers and cooperative members. Unfortunately, I was unable to interview foreign 
tour operators, government officials, or project supervisors contracted by the European 
Union due to time restrictions. This would have certainly allowed me to gain a more 
comprehensive perspective of León’s tourism ecosystem than the narrow scope of my 
research presented in this paper. Additionally, I conducted site visits. These visits 
included the cluster of homes closest to the Telica crater, the model farm and apiary, and 
the tourism infrastructure that Fuertes Juntos constructed. I visited the site before and 
after the volcanic eruption that occurred in November 2015 to survey the damage upon 
my return to Nicaragua in 2016 (Figure 5 and Figure 6). I also visited on several 
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occasions the cooperative’s León office it rented to improve its visibility and better sell 
its volcano hikes and community tours to backpackers. 
 What set my first visit apart from my second visit was that in the first I served as a 
volunteer for Fuertes Juntos. Therefore, I was conducting participant-observation 
research. This ethnographic research method allowed me to learn about the organization 
and its relationship to the communities in which it works by contributing to their work in 
whatever capacity I was able. As a volunteer, I wrote blog articles, translated board-
meeting transcriptions, brainstormed project ideas, co-wrote grant proposals, and aided in 
road clearing and farming. While I in fact did some doing, in no way did the organization 
rely on my volunteer labor. I merely served as a support. However, I was not always 
participating; I also played a passive role. I sat in on weekly staff meetings, attended 
forums in both the municipal government office and on the Telica volcano, and observed 
countless capacity training sessions. My constant presence and involvement helped me 
build trust with all parties involved in the tourism project. People saw the value of my 
research, and supported me by consenting to interviews and providing me with resources, 
such as legal documents and business constitutions. 
 In summary, I conducted a multi-sited ethnography across time, space, and 
culture. That is, my visits were spread over a span of one year and three months, with a 
five-month hiatus from my research in between. This prolonged period of time allowed 
me to conduct follow-up interviews and site visits. It also allowed me to track changes 
over time regarding the development of the tourism project, as well as beneficiaries’ 
perceptions of that project throughout. My research was not only multi-sited in a 
chronological sense, but also in a spatial sense. As described above, I followed Fuertes 
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Juntos staff from the office to the field, and sometimes from the office to the municipal 
government building. I also met with community members at various locations, including 
their homes, the model farms, hiking trails, and their León-based office. For both groups, 
a large amount of my research actually happened while traveling to and from the volcano 
in the back of a pick-up truck.  
 Lastly, my research was multi-sited in a conceptual sense. I was a bilingual 
American anthropologist studying a British NGO with a largely Nicaraguan staff, the 
majority of which were born and raised in the city of León. Meanwhile, community 
members living on the Telica volcano infrequently travel to the city, and they boast that 
they are culturally different from their urban-dwelling Nicaraguan counterparts. In fact, 
many believe that they are morally superior because they falsely claim that vices like 
alcohol, tobacco, and infidelity do not exist in their rural communities. Field visits unified 
these distinct groups in a single site, and meetings were typically centered on a common 
issue. Although meetings were conducted in Spanish, cultural misunderstandings 
constantly occurred. Therefore, bodies became loci of interest due to the different cultural 
values and life histories they embodied. That is, they became sites themselves. This 
concept will be particularly useful in understanding the challenges that Fuertes Juntos 
faced in developing the tourism project on the Telica Rota Natural Reserve. As the 
following sections demonstrate, a radical interpretation needed to occur between Fuertes 
Juntos and community members that moved beyond language to the ethereal realm of 




 During my first few months as volunteer, it became apparent that important 
differences existed between Fuertes Juntos’ and Telica Unida’s understanding of the 
cooperative model. These differences were largely rooted in culture. Fuertes Juntos 
leadership was confident that cooperatives were sensible business models to incorporate 
in the rural communities of the Telica Rota Natural Reserve. In particular, David 
demonstrated himself to be a fierce advocate for cooperative development. He grew 
dismayed when he resumed the mantle of director in July 2015 after taking a six-month 
sabbatical to find that Telica Unida was not functioning as he had intended. Left without 
his direct supervision, the cooperative had evolved into something else. While at its 
core—and by legal definition—it remained a cooperative, Telica Unida was becoming 
less inclusive, and more exclusive. That is, it denied membership to enthusiastic 
community members that had been originally involved in David’s early tourism training 
sessions. In particular, David felt that the cooperative—composed largely of middle-aged 
men—was actively discriminating against community youth who saw the tourism project 
as an opportunity to earn additional income as tour guides. 
 At the moment of this discovery, David called for an emergency staff meeting to 
discuss the implications. He was visibly upset. After all, he had high expectations for the 
project, and he did not trust Telica Unida’s president enough to let the cooperative 
continue in this unexpected direction on its own. He urged for Fuertes Juntos to 
intervene. He decided that if after that the cooperative still refused to make policy 
changes and provide membership to the young tour guides, Fuertes Juntos would pull out 
of the project completely. That is, he was willing to forgo the third and final installment 
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of the European Union grant, and leave the café and hostel only partially built. He wanted 
no part to play in a project that had already led to exclusion, and, he feared, would 
eventually lead to corruption if left on this trajectory. 
 In a PowerPoint presentation David gave the following week to Fuertes Juntos’ 
predominantly Nicaraguan staff, he explained that cooperatives were highly successful 
models in Europe, and he believed this business model offered enormous potential for the 
Telica volcano community given their scarce resources. In essence, cooperatives allow 
members to pull their limited resources together, and share the profit of their labor. In 
farming communities, for example, it could mean buying fertilizer together instead of 
each farmer buying his own. In theory, this would lower costs. Additionally, if several 
farmers devote their time, energy, and resources to the same piece of land, this in turn 
could increase production and crop yield, leading to increased profits (personal 
correspondence, July 2015). Furthermore, David explained that traditionally cooperative 
members pay a one-time membership fee to join. Once they become members, they are 
each given voting power to make executive decisions regarding the business. In this way, 
power is distributed evenly among all cooperative members, since each member—
independent of position (e.g. president, vice president, treasurer, etc.)—has one vote. 
While they all have the same number of votes, they do not necessarily all receive the 
same pay. Income generated is distributed to members based on hours worked. Members 
who work more hours correspondingly receive more pay. Additionally, a percentage of 
total income is set aside. Members vote on whether to use this money to pay bonuses or 
reinvest in the business. Given cooperatives’ major success in Europe, David reckoned, it 
was an optimal model to implement in Nicaragua. 
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 In fact, cooperatives are no new concept in Nicaragua. Cooperatives grew in 
popularity after the Sandinistas won the revolutionary war in 1979. After they rose to 
power, the socialist government formed farming cooperatives on land that had been 
seized from terratenientes. Terratenientes belonged to a powerful, land-owning class that 
amassed large amounts of wealth and political influence by essentially controlling a 
serfdom made up of poor, mestizo farmers. As a means of redistributing wealth and 
providing justice to the pueblo, the Sandinistas re-appropriated the land to the proletariat 
mestizos. These farmers, however, were poor and uneducated, and were not able to 
effectively manage the land. Furthermore, they faced several harsh winters, and lost 
many crops. They consequently fell into debt. The national bank therefore seized their 
land and placed them in the hands of the government (personal correspondence, 
November 2015). 
 Many older Nicaraguans today remember the introduction of cooperatives as a 
corrupt government scam that knowingly targeted naïve farmers. They believe that the 
government did so anticipating that the farmers would be unable to manage their new 
wealth, thus making a government land seizure not only inevitable, but also justifiable. 
Some former cooperative members also feel uneasy about cooperatives because they 
remember it as inhibitive. The government placed limits on the price at which a farmer 
could sell his goods, reducing competition. They believe that this example of government 
overreach stifled their ability to succeed financially. Consequently, older Nicaraguans 
maintain a traumatic memory of cooperatives post-revolution, and therefore generally 
regard them negatively. Younger Nicaraguans, however, have largely forgotten this part 
of their country’s history, and are eager to try the cooperative model out. 
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 Misunderstandings surrounding the purpose and function of cooperatives as a 
result of their historical context may account for part of the reason Telica Unida deviated 
from David’s expectations. However, in the minds of Fuertes Juntos leadership, the 
dynamic described above between the cooperative members and the young tour guides 
ultimately boiled down to money and power. To address the former, Telica Unida 
members broke with tradition and voted to divide the profits equally between all 
members, regardless of hours worked. In order to maximize their income, they decided to 
bar further community members from joining their collective. Logically, they feared that 
the more members the cooperative had, the less money each one would receive. This did 
not only contrast to standard payment policies, but it also went against the egalitarian 
spirit of cooperatives that David hoped the project would instill. That is, he believed that 
the decision was rooted in greed and individualism, not inclusivity and community.  
 In fact, Fuertes Juntos leadership speculated that power imbalances contributed to 
the present situation due to differences in age and status between Telica Unida and the 
tour guides. To provide context, David intended for Telica Unida to be a cooperative that 
performed a variety of functions, including but not limited to road maintenance, hotel and 
restaurant management, and tours. While interested community members were trained in 
several of these functions, a split occurred after David left on sabbatical. Middle-aged 
and older adults became official Telica Unida members, while young adults and 
teenagers did not. Instead they became low-paid tour guides contracted by Telica Unida, 
while Telica Unida assumed all higher-paying management responsibilities discussed 
above. While it is still unclear how this happened, it is believed that the older adults used 
their age-related status within the community to discourage the others from joining. 
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Additionally, many of the Telica Unida members are the fathers or uncles of several tour 
guides, and might have used this as leverage (community workshop on cooperation, 
October 2015). When asked about the divide, however, Telica Unida members refer back 
to their constitution, which states that immediate relatives are not allowed to be members 
of the cooperative in order to avoid certain families from disproportionately benefiting 
from the tourism project. 
 Furthermore, Telica Unida views its relationship with the tour guides not as one 
defined by exploitation, but by social impact. In one interview, the vice president of 
Telica Unida said it was unfortunate that Fuertes Juntos had judged the cooperative 
without meeting them first to understand their perspective. He claimed that in fact there 
had been a misunderstanding between Telica Unida and Fuertes Juntos. According to 
him, the cooperative decided to limit membership to tour guides because they did not 
believe that cooperative membership should be the end goal for the guides. Instead, he 
said that Telica Unida hoped to redirect the resources and training they received from 
Fuertes Juntos to mentor the tour guides themselves. He said their goal was to support the 
tour guides, not compete with them. Furthermore, he expressed that contracting the tour 
guides was akin to providing them with an apprenticeship opportunity, which the 
cooperative hoped they would use to work as tour guides independent of any one 
particular tour operator (personal correspondence, December 2015). In essence, the vice 
president viewed Telica Unida not only as a source of employment, but also as a leader in 
community development.  
 Telica Unida’s president, who is also the community leader, echoed this point. He 
said that the ultimate goal of Telica Unida is to provide social services on the Telica 
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volcano and surrounding communities. For example, he would like Telica Unida to use 
its social capital to find funding to provide emergency medical transport from the volcano 
to León, since currently the only method to transport the injured or sick is having several 
men take turns carrying them in a hammock on a two hour hike down the face of the 
volcano. He also says that he would like Telica Unida to use a percentage of its income to 
provide elderly care, donate school materials, fund burials for the deceased, and host end 
of year activities (personal correspondence, August 2016). By law, they are required to 
use six percent of their income towards community development projects to maintain 
their cooperative status (personal correspondence, December 2015). 
 While power politics may or may not be the cause of this division, it is certainly a 
consequence of it. For example, rather than fully integrate the tour guides into the 
cooperative, Telica Unida members decided they would contract tour guides instead. 
Without cooperative membership, tour guides are not allowed to make executive 
decisions regarding the community tourism project. Without a vote, they have less 
bargaining power in negotiating their pay. As a result, Telica Unida has monopolized 
decision-making. In other words, it has complete power to make critical decisions that 
preference its interests over those of the tour guides. The cooperative members therefore 
unilaterally agreed to pay tour guides a flat rate of approximately $10 for each tour group 
they guide in Telica, regardless of the number of individuals in that group, whether just 
three people or twelve or more. Therefore, the larger the tour group, the more egregious 
the pay differential. Fuertes Juntos does not agree with this decision for two reasons. 
First, David is convinced that tour guides in fact do the bulk of the work, and should 
therefore be paid appropriately. Second, tour guides may decide that they no longer want 
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to receive the low, below-market wages Telica Unida provides, and seek employment 
with foreign owned tour operators based in León. This would undermine the original 
motive of beginning a “pro-poor” tourism project on Telica. 
 In order to try to convince Telica Unida to provide cooperative membership to the 
tour guides, David scheduled a meeting with both parties in August 2015 to address the 
particular issues described above. In essence, he wanted to convince them to change their 
pay model to eliminate the incentive for excluding the tour guides. The cooperative, 
however, was not having it. At one point, the president of Telica Unida said that he 
believed that David was trying to coerce the cooperative to do things Fuertes Juntos’ 
way. He expressed distrust, and acknowledged that Fuertes Juntos had more leverage 
because they had more economic capital in the relationship. It became clear that Telica 
Unida was intent on exercising its autonomy and resisting the influence of outside forces. 
It wanted to make decisions on its own. 
 While David disagreed with Telica Unida’s position, he ultimately decided to 
continue forward with the project and see it to its end. The project concluded at the end of 
October with the inauguration of the café. The café was the only building to be 
completed, although it still lacked a kitchen, dinnerware, and seating. In November, 
however, Fuertes Juntos experienced a string of bad luck. The organization had overspent 
its budget, and found itself in a dire financial crisis. Furthermore, the Telica volcano 
erupted. It spewed huge, boiling hot rocks from its crater. These rocks landed on nearby 
properties. They crushed several horses and cows to death, and tore holes through 
families’ roofs. Not even the café was spared. The roof endured a beating. During a site 
visit several months later, the Fuertes Juntos team counted over twenty holes in the roof, 
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even damaging its structural integrity. Due to the weight and velocity at which the rocks 
were moving, the floor also sustained damage. That is, some rocks crashed through the 
concrete roof, and then went through the concrete floor, where they traveled several feet 
below surface (Figure 7). Fuertes Juntos was not only in debt, but it also lost a large 
portion of its investment thanks to the volcanic activity. The government barred entry to 
the volcano for over one month due to safety concerns, delaying any immediate 
assessments of the damage. Then in December, Fuertes Juntos reluctantly laid off two 
team members, and its remaining staff worked overtime to find additional funding 
sources for the new year. 
 Telica Unida was also devastated by the eruption. Not only did some of its 
members lose livestock in the volcanic eruption, but many also became discouraged 
about the prospects that the tourism project offered due to the damage the café sustained, 
and Nuevas Esperanza’s lack of involvement thereafter. The president even went to 
social media to express his frustration over what had occurred. Moreover, the cooperative 
members had an “I told you so moment.” They had originally advised Fuertes Juntos not 
to build the café in that particular location near the crater. According to Telica Unida, 
they were familiar with the dangers of the volcano, and knew that area near the crater to 
be vulnerable to volcanic activity. According to Fuertes Juntos, however, this was 
impossible for them to have known since the last eruption of this kind happened decades 
ago. Rather, Fuertes Juntos leadership asserts that the true reason Telica Unida 
disapproved of the café’s location was related to control. Telica Unida wanted the hostel 
and café to be built on land they rented from the government; land that they perceived to 
be theirs. Meanwhile, Fuertes Juntos and the municipal government feared ceding all 
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control of the tourism project to the community. Therefore, they agreed to build the 
hostel on Telica Unida’s land, and the cafe on public land. Instead of giving 100 percent 
control of the tourism infrastructure to Telica Unida, they only got 50 percent. Therefore, 
if Telica Unida ever decided to sell its business to a private entity—although illegal—the 
municipal government would be able to maintain ownership of the café. 
 In fact, disputes regarding land rights and natural resource management were 
another major theme to emerge during the development of the tourism project. The Telica 
Rota Natural Reserve is a national park and therefore public property. The communities 
that live there illegally settled along the volcano’s slopes nearly 50 years ago. By the time 
the government discovered them, too many families had made a life for themselves there 
to simply kick them out. They had built houses, raised livestock, and grew beans and corn 
on their farms. The municipal government therefore gave them informal permission to 
continue living on and using the land. Although the community members do not 
technically own the land, the lack of government presence has aided them in perceiving 
the land to be their own. As a result, they cut down trees for farming, repair damaged 
roads, and charge an entrance fee to enter “their” property. In fact, they have been known 
to threaten tour operators with machetes in the past for failing to pay this fee. According 
to one informant, ideas of ownership likely also contributed to the property conflict 
regarding the café and hostel discussed above (personal correspondence, March 2016). 
 The volcanic eruption not only renewed old tension regarding the placement of 
the café, but it also led to further feelings of neglect. Out of concerns for safety, the 
municipal government barred all entry to the volcano. Fuertes Juntos was unable to return 
to the Telica volcano for over one month after the eruption, and until present the 
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municipal government has refused to allow its officials near the crater. Furthermore, 
Fuertes Juntos has been unable to find additional funding to repair the café and finish 
work on the hostel. As a result, Telica Unida searched for other funding to finish the job 
that Fuertes Juntos had begun. They received a grant from the Peace Corps to construct a 
kitchen and dining area near the hostel on “their” property (Figure 8). However, it was 
not enough to cover the entire cost. Therefore, they made up the difference by taking out 
a loan from a friend in León. They also had to arrange to transport the building materials 
to the crater after Fuertes Juntos had declined to offer them support. Using independently 
contracted construction workers, they built a modest kitchen with a refrigerator and stove. 
The electricity is supplied by solar panels on its roof. With the new café finished, they 
hope to procure additional funding to install windows and doors on the hostel (Figure 9). 
Tourists currently sleep in the hostel using foam mattresses and sleeping bags, and dogs 
sometimes sneak into the hostel and take their belongings while they are asleep or away 
on hikes. Additionally, some tourists have complained that the lack of windows and 
doors makes them feel unsafe. Telica Unida hopes that by making infrastructural 
improvements, they can provide a higher-quality service to tourists. Some of them also 
believe that it would allow them to focus their efforts on skill building, like learning 




 As the ethnography above details, tourism development on the Telica Rota 
Natural Reserve was fraught with issues related to cultural misunderstandings among the 
distinct social groups implementing the project. At the core of these cultural 
misunderstandings, however, was a jostle for power. All the while, Telica Unida defiantly 
attempted to exert its agency to determine the outcome of the tourism project. This was 
evident in conflicts relating to cooperative development and land management. 
Regarding the former, Fuertes Juntos leadership was intent on forming a cooperative 
under a strictly European model. This ideology, however, was incompatible with local 
understandings of cooperatives. Furthermore, Fuertes Juntos was in a position to impose 
its ideology onto Telica Unida. Some cooperative members even acknowledged this; 
recall that the president claimed that Fuertes Juntos was using its political and economic 
capital to pressure the cooperative into changing its pay model. 
 In many ways, Fuertes Juntos’ relationship with Telica Unida mirrored that of the 
Sandinista government’s relationship with farming cooperatives in the past. The 
government controlled market prices for goods. Cooperative members viewed this as an 
infringement of their liberty to fully participate as economic citizens in the way they had 
envisioned. Similarly, Fuertes Juntos attempted to control cooperative membership, 
operations, and pay structure, and threatened to withdraw their support of the project if 
the cooperative did not make changes to allow for the tour guides to join their collective. 
Undoubtedly, the motives are different. According to Nicaraguans’ accounts, the 
government controlled cooperatives in order to oppress them. If anything, Fuertes Juntos 
attempted to control Telica Unida in order to protect the guides from oppression by 
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community elders. Despite the differing rationale, the ends remain the same. Telica 
Unida felt that their independence from external influences was threatened, and they 
successfully managed to retain their agency. 
  While they managed to hold onto their autonomy from Fuertes Juntos’ influence, 
the struggle may not be over yet. That is, their renewed relationship with the municipal 
government may prove to be another battle to be fought. For decades, the inhabitants of 
the Telica volcano were largely forgotten by the municipal government. Although they 
had been previously living outside of the government’s gaze, they were brought back 
under its control due to the community development projects Fuertes Juntos began. This 
was a point of contention regarding land rights and land management in constructing the 
café. Because the café was built on public land, the municipal government now has the 
power to seize it from the community on a whim. Furthermore, they now have a stake in 
the community tourism project, and may try to control what is legally theirs. 
Additionally, the cooperative for years had been collecting an entrance fee for tour 
groups to pass through their land. The municipal government, however, now expects 
them to use a percentage of that income to fund park rangers and road maintenance. 
Whereas before community members had unlimited power to arbitrarily collect money 
from visitors and manage the land as they pleased, moving forward they must negotiate 
with the governmental forces now at play.   
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Conclusions  
 Community-based tourism projects are promising initiatives in alleviating 
poverty. They are highly successful models in providing communities with increased 
employment opportunities, and distributing wealth from wealthy tourists to poor 
communities in developing countries. Furthermore, tourism development in rural areas 
reintegrates subsistence farming communities into an economy in which they had 
previously been marginalized. Despite the overwhelmingly positive impact tourism can 
provide, however, the present ethnography demonstrates that barriers exist in meeting all 
its intended goals. For example, infrastructure is critical in providing tourists with the 
services they might expect upon visiting a site, such as food and lodging. Additionally, 
locals need training in marketing, tour giving, business management, quality insurance, 
and customer service. Language skills are also a plus, especially in a country like 
Nicaragua where the majority of tour operators are foreign-owned and have English-
speaking staff. Like any other business, community-based tour operators need to be able 
to successfully compete in the market, or else they might fall behind. 
 While many of these issues are foreseeable, the situation I found myself studying 
on the Telica Rota Natural Reserve was inconvenient. David expected the cooperative to 
evolve in the way he had trained them. However, when he returned from sabbatical the 
cooperative had become what he saw to be a potentially exploitative body in the 
community. Furthermore, the volcanic eruption was a major setback for the project, 
especially because it happened just one month after the project cycle had ended. Without 
the procurement of further funds, the tourism project is effectively dead from Fuertes 
Juntos’ end. The cooperative, however, is determined to see the project through. They 
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even asked me to use my network to search for funding for them. One added that if I go 
on to work for an NGO in León, to make sure to return to Telica to help them finish the 
project that Fuertes Juntos started. Unfortunately, project funding does not work that 
way. As a staff member at an NGO, I would have little ability to fulfill their requests. 
 Based on my research with Fuertes Juntos and Telica Unida, I recommend that 
non-profit organizations do the following when implementing projects. First, do not enter 
communities with preconceived notions of what motives they might have to act in certain 
ways. Cooperative members expressed to me that they wish Fuertes Juntos had talked to 
them before accusing them of exploiting the tour guides. Second, it is important to 
understand the cultural-historical background of any humanitarian intervention being 
implemented in a foreign context. Although Fuertes Juntos staff spoke Spanish, cultural 
barriers continued to lead to misunderstandings. Specifically, these barriers related to 
differences in cooperative ideology. A more serious effort to translate not only literal 
language, but also cultural differences in multi-stakeholder meetings could have allowed 
for greater cohesion in the project’s implementation.  
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Figure 1 Tourists prepare to sled down Volcán Cerro Negro in a popular tourist activity known as "volcano 













Figure 4 Telica community members receive Red Cross emergency training as part of the Fuertes Juntos' 





Figure 5 The café Fuertes Juntos built on the Telica volcano during construction; image taken before the 




Figure 6 Image taken following the November 2015 volcanic eruption. The roof sustained significant 




Figure 7 A hole formed in the concrete floor from the impact of a high-velocity rock from the November 
2015 eruption (Bridges 2016). 
 
 
Figure 8 New café built by Telica Unida with the help of a grant from the Peace Corps (Bridges 2016). 
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Figure 9 The unfinished hostel constructed by Fuertes Juntos personnel with funding from the European 
Union (Bridges 2016). 
